| I spoke at length about kidnap response to noted crisis | | | | "Any time you have pragmatic kidnappers who are in it |
| manager Dr. Neil Livingstone. Before proceeding with | | | | for the money, it is generally good to have publicity," |
| my report, I'd like to explain why I turned to him, as I | | | | Livingstone says. |
| have for many years, for insight. His short biography, | | | | "In that case, the best protection a hostage can have |
| on the AEI Speakers Bureau website, speaks for itself: | | | | is publicity." |
| "Dr. Neil Livingstone is Co-Chairman and CEO of a | | | | Why? |
| crisis management firm in Washington, DC. During the | | | | "Publicity puts pressure on the hostage-taker. It signals |
| past two decades he has served as a "corporate | | | | to them that they can't just dump the guy. The |
| equalizer" on a variety of investigative assignments | | | | international community gets alarmed. They put |
| including kidnappings, homicides, industrial espionage, | | | | pressure on all concerned. |
| celebrity stalking, missing CEOs and threats against top | | | | "In Beirut, everyone knew there were hostages. |
| executives. Dr. Neil Livingstone taught for ten years at | | | | Publicity helped resolve the situation." |
| Georgetown University and has served on advisory | | | | In some ransom situations, Livingstone says, the crisis |
| panels to the Secretary of State, the Chief of Naval | | | | managers want to negotiate for a reduced payment. |
| Operations and the Pentagon." | | | | That approach can backfire. |
| Herewith his thoughts on kidnap management. | | | | "The wisdom of working to keep the ransom low is |
| Is it best to publicize or suppress a kidnap? The | | | | debatable." Those types of negotiations serve only to |
| answer depends on the type of incident. | | | | prolong the victims' ordeal. "Every country that delays |
| "You have to determine whether the captors are | | | | paying a ransom in order to get a better deal winds up |
| extremists motivated by ideology, or if they are in it for | | | | being taken to account. |
| money," Livingstone says. | | | | "The hostage sues." |
| "Extremists don't want money. They want to show | | | | This is not to say that a hostage kidnap can be |
| their power. They want to kill the hostage and show | | | | resolved simply. "It's hard to pay ransoms," Livingstone |
| their power." In such a case, Livingstone says, "Publicity | | | | warns. "A lot can go wrong." |
| hurts." | | | | The kidnappers, for example, cannot always be relied |
| The noted crisis manager adds: "You should keep | | | | upon to act in good faith. The captives can become ill, |
| quiet only in a situation where extremists are not | | | | or too weak to travel to the exchange site. Nerves |
| interested in ransom, where they want to kill the | | | | can get frazzled, and participants can get |
| hostage and demonstrate their power." | | | | trigger-happy during the hand-off. |
| Such was the case with Wall Street Journal reporter | | | | No matter how the situation is classified, though, the |
| Daniel Pearl, who was captured in 2002 by a militant | | | | entire kidnap dynamic is extremely challenging. |
| group calling itself The National Movement for the | | | | "There is a delicate choreography in liberating a |
| Restoration of Pakistani Sovereignty. The captors | | | | hostage," Livingstone says. "Look what it took to |
| brutally murdered the innocent journalist. | | | | liberate the hostages from Columbia. |
| Ransom situations, however, are different. | | | | "It all must be handled with extreme care. |