| Since Friday August 14, the Nigerian banking system | | | | |
| has not been the same. What started as a rumour | | | | This may have taken a longer time but no doubt the |
| that some bank chiefs were about to be sacked | | | | process would have been more tidy and transparent. |
| became real. The CEOs of Intercontinental Bank, | | | | The haste with which CBN has sacked the MD’s |
| Oceanic Bank, Finbank, Union Bank and Afribank went | | | | has been overtly populist. Surprisingly, the CBN sacked |
| to the office as CEOs in the morning and returned | | | | only the MD’s leaving the board, whose |
| home early and jobless and with the real prospect that | | | | responsibility it is to ensure proper banking is enshrined |
| they were also on the verge of losing their stakes in | | | | in their institutions, intact. It is not clear why the CBN |
| the banks they have sat on as owner managers for | | | | sacked the MD’s and left the boards intact. If there |
| close to two decades. | | | | has been a failure in these institutions, it was a failure |
| | | | | of the board rather than executive management. |
| The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), the apex | | | | Leaving the board intact is an endorsement of poor |
| regulatory organ for Nigerian banks had taken the | | | | corporate governance and the continuation of board |
| decision to wield the biggest stick in the Nigerian | | | | negligence and inactivity which has primarily been the |
| banking industry. Sacking five CEO’s, three of | | | | course of recurrent bank failures. If the CBN really |
| whom before the sack, were considered among the | | | | wanted to change the way banking is done in the |
| top five banks in the country, have been described as | | | | country, sacking the board would have be the best |
| the Nigerian banking tsunami. | | | | action as it would sent the strongest signal that sitting |
| | | | | on the board of a bank comes with its privileges but it |
| Justifying its action, the CBN facts are convincing. The | | | | also comes with huge responsibilities which must not |
| five banks according to CBN had given out loans of | | | | be taken for granted. |
| close to N2.8 trillion of which close to 50 percent were | | | | |
| classified as none performing. The five banks, said the | | | | Regulatory exuberance is further displayed in the CBN |
| CBN, had become virtually illiquid accounting for 90 | | | | action with its hasty publication of the list of bank |
| percent of inter bank borrowing over a seven month | | | | debtors without even allowing the new management it |
| period, first through the CBN expanded discount | | | | had put in place in the banks it had taken over to settle |
| window and then when the window was closed and | | | | in. Basically, the CBN action has removed the greatest |
| the interbank market opened, they borrowed from the | | | | tool the new management has in collecting these loans, |
| interbank window to pay down their debts at the | | | | that is the threat of “Name and Shame” the |
| EDW. This, no doubt was a clear sign that these | | | | debtors. Having lost this tool, they have now resorted |
| banks had run out of money to meet their day to day | | | | to the lame tool of threat of arrest. |
| operations and will collapse like a pack of cards if they | | | | |
| are not able to borrow short term funds from the | | | | This is a lame threat considering that lending is not a |
| interbank market. | | | | crime neither is borrowing. Lending without collateral is |
| | | | | an offence under BOFIA but there is no definition what |
| Besides, their desperation at the interbank market was | | | | collateral is and besides no bank lends without a form |
| also distorting rates at that window where the CBN | | | | of collateral. And still in the spirit of regulatory |
| was doing all it can to reduce the lending rates. As long | | | | exuberance the EFCC goes ahead to ask debtors to |
| as these big banks engaged in desperate borrowing | | | | pay within seven days by issuing a draft in favour of |
| from this window, the CBN efforts to bring down | | | | the Federal Government. The first question is, did the |
| interbank lending would be fruitless. It was obvious that | | | | Federal government lend money to these so called |
| these banks could only survive their critical liquidity | | | | debtors? So why should they pay money to the |
| challenges with a fresh injection of equity or debt | | | | Federal Government? |
| capital. | | | | |
| But considering the state of both local and international | | | | Then where will the alleged N774 billion owed by the |
| capital markets, it was obvious that any attempt by | | | | debtors come from? Is it from the supposedly healthy |
| these banks to raise fresh capital may be like a camel | | | | banks in the system? How many of the supposedly |
| going through the eye of the needle. | | | | healthy banks survive the removal of N774 billion from |
| | | | | their vaults in seven days? This order does not only |
| So the CBN was left with the option of injecting its | | | | smack of regulatory exuberance but also strong |
| own capital, arranging a bail out of the banks like it | | | | ignorance of how the financial system works. And the |
| happened in America. In its wisdom however, the CBN | | | | truth is that if the banking system had N774 billion |
| felt that, it would not pump in capital and allow the | | | | lying around in its vaults, there will not be liquidity crisis, |
| same managers, which by their action and inaction | | | | neither will interbank and lending rates be hitting new |
| allowed their banks to run into this state of illiquidity to | | | | highs. |
| continue to sit at the top of management. Most | | | | |
| importantly, it is obvious that the CBN felt that it was | | | | The most dangerous aspect of the current regulatory |
| time, that it sent a strong message out there that poor | | | | exuberance however is the current attempt to |
| banking practices in the industry will no longer be | | | | criminalize lending and borrowing. Since 2005, the |
| allowed. | | | | Nigerian economy has been able to sustain a growth |
| | | | | rate of six percent and above and this period also |
| But in the process of sending out this message to the | | | | marked the unprecedented growth in bank lending to |
| industry has the CBN “over killed.” It is obvious | | | | the private sector. The link between economic growth |
| that Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, riding on his strong | | | | and bank lending is not coincidental as many |
| reputation as a risk manager, may have unduly | | | | economists will tell you. This is where the danger lies in |
| focused on curtailing poor credit risk practices in the | | | | the current CBN/EFCC joint efforts to criminalize the |
| industry without taking into consideration reputational | | | | act of lending and borrowing. |
| risk. So in an attempt to pluck the loop holes created | | | | |
| by poor credit risk practices, the Sanusi may have left | | | | There is a real possibility that this may result in a credit |
| the banks exposed to reputation risk damage that the | | | | freeze to the economy. First banks may become |
| concerned banks may never recover from and the | | | | averse to take the risk of lending to the vulnerable |
| banking industry at large may take a long time to | | | | sectors of the economy that usually have a higher risk |
| overcome. | | | | of default why entrepreneurs will also become averse |
| | | | | to borrowing. If this happens, the impact will be |
| Was there a better way to effect the significant | | | | disastrous to the economy. The already high |
| changes required in the practice of banking in Nigeria | | | | unemployment rate will get worse and poverty will be |
| without creating all the drama that is currently | | | | intensified. |
| prevalent in the Nigerian banking industry? Many have | | | | |
| argued that the CBN could have forced all the banks | | | | There is no doubt that following years of carefree |
| to make the required provisions, declared their losses | | | | growth; the banking industry needed an urgent dose of |
| and take the hit on their capital that would have | | | | sanity. But sadly, the way the CBN has gone about it |
| invariably resulted and demanded the recapitalization | | | | will harm the Nigerian economy in the long run. The |
| plans from the board of the banks. Where they were | | | | CBN under Sanusi has effectively replaced irrational |
| not in a position to recapitalize, the CBN will move in | | | | market exuberance with its own regulatory |
| with its new capital and as the new majority owner, | | | | exuberance. |
| sack the board and effect the necessary changes. | | | | |